The Prospects of Federalism in the Philippines: A Challenge to Political Decentralization of the Unitary State

RIZAL G. BUENDIA*

The quest towards an authentic political decentralization remains to be realized despite the presence of adequate public policies. The Philippine government has made several attempts to effect a genuine autonomy, e.g., the Decentralization Act of 1967, the 1983 Local Government Code, the 1987 Constitution, among others. However, the recognition of the local government autonomy has been largely viewed from the framework of a unitary political structure wherein the local government units are not considered sovereign and most of their operations, functions and powers are limited and controlled by the national government. This prompted some groups to consider the idea of federalism as an alternative strategy for regional and national development on the basis of the country's socio-economic, political and cultural diversities.

Introduction

This paper challenges the generally accepted notion of "political decentralization" under a unitary state system. The unitary system in the Philippines has been basically premised on a "one-nation, one-state" concept. This premise has been seriously challenged by recent studies on the existence of "multi-nation" in the national polity which has been historically created by the struggles of the people against colonialism.[1] Moreover, the experience of the country under the policy of political decentralization has not only been discouraging but also counter-productive to its goals.

The issue of maintaining a unitary state even in the face of the quest for autonomy of tribal minorities and the constitutional mandate to devolve power to suit the needs of local governments should be seriously addressed for political decentralization to be effective. Whether the question of political and administrative autonomy can be substantially accommodated and enjoyed by local governmental units (LGUs) under a unitary system remains to be a policy issue. However, in the event that the extant policy of a unitary system becomes a structural impediment in the promotion of local autonomy, then the political re-structuring of the Philippine governmental system becomes a national question.

The problem therefore rests on the efficacy of the unitary political system in supporting and promoting the State policy on local autonomy. This has to be resolved uncompromisingly if the government is indeed serious and sincere in the promotion of national unity, participative democracy, and political freedom among LGUs.

---

*Master of Public Administration student, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

The Political Imperatives of Decentralization:
A Continuing Quest and Dilemma

The continuing quest among LGUs for substantial autonomy and the recent creation of autonomous regions in the Cordillera and Muslim-Mindanao remain a challenge to the unitary system to effectuate authentic self-government and self-determination in the context of multi-varied systems and idiosyncracies among our people. The government remains to be the central institution of the people expected to serve as the catalyzing instrument in achieving national unity and resolving regional socio-economic imbalances in the entirety of the nation.

Decentralization policies were primarily and continually initiated by the national government in the attempt to transform the local governments as "effective instruments through which people can, in a most genuine fashion, govern themselves and work out their own destinies."[2]

As early as 1967, the government made an explicit declaration through Republic Act 5185 (Decentralization Act of 1967), that local government autonomy shall be aimed at effecting "a more equitable and systematic distribution of governmental powers and resources." In the 1983 Local Government Code, the government accentuated the imperatives of local government autonomy not only in the development of "self-reliant communities" but also as "effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress."[3] Towards this end, the 1987 Constitution lifted the Local Government Code's Declaration of Policy and embodied it in Article IX, Section 3 of the said Constitution which stipulates that the State "shall provide a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization" whereby local governments shall be given more "powers, responsibilities and resources."

The recognition of local government autonomy has been largely viewed from the framework of a unitary political structure whereby LGUs are not considered sovereign but corporate bodies, political subdivisions, and general-purpose governments. The LGUs encompass territories, constituencies, governing bodies, roles, powers, and organizational structure, rules for selecting leaders, and modes of citizen participation in local governance which are defined and prescribed within the scope and limitation as determined by the national government.[4] However, the historically centrist tendencies of the government[5] have substantially worked against the essence of local autonomy simply because the LGUs do not share equal power and authority with the central government. The Local Government Code which was considered by public administration scholars as a watershed in the history of local government autonomy, ironically made the decentralization program an illusion rather than facilitated its reality.

For instance, although the local governments have been granted greater revenue-generating powers by the Code, the national government has pre-empted most of the productive revenue and tax sources in the local units. Local tax efforts have been militated with the tax exemptions on businesses engaged in the printing and publication of papers, magazines, and other printed materials appearing at regular intervals; franchise on broadcast stations and TV firms duly registered with the Broadcast Media Council; and, grantees of electric franchises and holders of franchise that contain a proviso that the national franchise tax "shall be in lieu of all other taxes."[6] This

prohibition practically left nothing for the local units to impose tax on.

Likewise, the limitation on LGUs to impose tax on the buying or selling of agricultural products when sold by the farmer, fisherman or an animal raiser himself; the incomes of commercial agricultural producers, exporters, and service establishments in the municipalities; and, on the estates and common carriers, thwart the taxing power granted to local authorities as embodied in the Local Tax Code and Local Government Code.[7]

The limited and eroding sources of local revenues (tax and non-tax) have made it extremely difficult for LGUs to finance their own development. This difficulty compels the local authorities to rely heavily on the national government in catalyzing and transforming their communities into self- sufficient economies. Under the prevailing control of economic and financial resources exercised by the central government, local units may see their taxing power under the Constitution rendered totally ineffective.

Moreover, the national government's authority over local financial management is reflected through the policies provided chiefly by the Department of Finance (DOF) and Department of Budget and Management (DBM), on the income and budgeting side respectively. The DOF formulates most policies on local revenue- generation and keeps a tight rein on many aspects of local finance. In spite of the authority and power granted to local executives and local councils by the Local Government Code to determine, control, and have the final decision to approve local budgetary requirements,[8] the aforecited national agencies continue to exercise authority and power through the "reviews" of local budgets and expenditures.

The leverage of the national government on local fiscal decision-making is basically exercised through spending decisions which are restricted by standard-regulations and directives. Local governments cannot spend more than 45 to 55 per cent of their total income from regular sources on personnel. They are mandated to allocate their income according to set percentages on different expenditure items. This practice has constricted about 40% of local budgets to limitations and directives.[9] Other restrictions are as follows:[10]

a) statutory reserve, constituted from 2% of estimated revenues from regular sources, to cover unforeseen circumstances; b) election reserve raised from the contribution of provincial, city, or municipal governments to defray one-third of election expenses under the election code; c) infrastructure fund transfer, based on 8 -12% annual net income in the general fund (GF), to be transferred to the infrastructure fund (IF); d) aid to hospitals, derived from 5-7% of net income, to serve as contribution for hospital services within the provinces; e) fund for the Integrated National Police (INP), drawn from 18% of the regular GF income to support local police and fire protection services; f) barangay development fund, raised from the GF of a province and city or municipality amounting to ₱500.00 per year for each barangay to defray the costs for barangay projects; and g) development fund, allocated from 20% of the BIR allotment to the GF, to be set aside for "development projects."

The prescription on the adoption of a performance type of budgeting among LGUs which intends to relate local planning with local finance and vice-versa is most absurd

when local governments do not have any control over their own finance much more to local development planning. Thus, the performance budget, which is a work-plan that specifies concrete project proposals to be accomplished during the financial year, has not only been inoperative but found to be impractical and irrelevant.

The control of the national government over local budgets rendered the authority granted to local councils and chief executives in determining their own budgetary requirements practically useless. To subject local budgets to review by the central authorities, through the DBM, for reasons of assuring LGUs' compliance to national guidelines and prescriptions, is a clear expression of lack of confidence and trust on the capability as well as competence of the local authorities to assume their responsibilities to their constituents. Apparently, the pronouncement that "local government's control over local budgets"[11] is nothing but a misnomer.

Even local treasurers and assessors are appointed either by the President or the Secretary of Finance while the local executives can only recommend candidates for their assistants. Likewise, the personnel of the local Treasury Office are subject to the administrative rules set by the DOF and rarely controlled by the local chief executive. This is an explicit illustration of central control over local finance administration.

Apart from being subjected to constant dependence, local governments have been loyal servants of the central authorities (both for political and financial reasons) at the sacrifice of people's development in the local communities and hinterlands. Essentially, this negligence made the revolutionary government of the Communist Party of the Philippines - New People's Army - National Democratic Front muster political strength as they enjoy financial and moral support from the impoverished, abandoned, and neglected people. The people's sympathy to their cause stems from the failure of the local governments to provide the necessary and basic services to the community as its resources have been diverted to support the development and material enrichment of the highly-urbanized cities and the Manila government. Consequently, the revolutionary government has made its presence more apparent and responded more effectively to people's problems than the "duly constituted government."

A recent study made public by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, shows that an estimated 60% of 1,500 municipalities distributed in 73 provinces, especially those in the deep hinterland, have an average annual income of ₱300,000. And after deducting the salaries of the mayor, municipal council, and municipal employees as well as surrendering 7% of their income for the national hospital fund, 18% to the PC-INP fund, and 2% budgetary reserve, nothing is left to be spent for local development and social services. On the other hand, the more than 90% of the public works projects which are national in character have been centralized in the national government and had been the historical source of conflict between the congressmen and the Secretary of Public Works and Highways as each one squabbles for the control of these projects.[12]

Although certain studies have shown that local-source revenues have risen from 47% of total local income in 1972 to 57% in 1983 while national allotments, grants, and aids from the central to the local government have declined from 52% to 43% during the same period, these proportions remain short of fiscal self-reliance considering the increasing demands of development.[13] Even assuming that central government's

contribution to local development is adequate, the principle of relying on the central government for one's development simply promotes dependency and does not in any way contribute towards self-reliance.

With the insignificant fiscal powers vested upon local governments, planning for development in the local units has been extremely difficult. Implementation of development projects has been constricted as this has been contingent upon the availability of local funds.

The Philippine experience shows that our local governments remain imprisoned in a colonial, overcentralized structure which virtually denies them the possibility of taking initiatives and becoming self-reliant. As LGUs wretch over their meager financial resource, Metro Manila accounted for the highest share of almost a third of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1985.[14] The perpetual and total dependence of LGUs on the central government made it function as a broker for assistance for its constituencies.[15] This brokerage function perpetuated domestic colonialism and denied the feasibility of self-sustaining local development.

To cite two contemporary examples -- the people of Albay, who host the Tiwi geothermal plant, a significant contributor to the Luzon Grid, and whose homes are partly lighted by the cheap volcanic steam from the Bicol area, pay more than the people of Metro Manila. The people in Marawi City, geographical host to the lake which generates cheap hydro-electric power for Northern and Southern Mindanao, pay more for their electricity than the more privileged people of Zamboanga and Davao cities.[16] This paradox of life simply illustrates that the poor people in the countryside are the ones supporting the development and growth of the urban areas and not the other way around. In other words, Manila and other big cities maintain their affluence at the expense of the people in the impoverished communities.

It is ironic indeed that 75% of our people who are living in the countryside live in extreme poverty although their municipalities are richly endowed with mineral resources, forest, timber, excellent fishing grounds, and fertile lands. The plunder of natural resources and violence on the lives of the rural people have been carried on by the urban-based people and the Manila government with little benefit accruing to the rural people. Apart from its disrespect for the personal and social lives of the people, the central government's wanton exploitation of natural resources indicates its absence of regard to natural ecology.

This is a lucid illustration wherein the unitary political system can be a convenient tool to subvert the political and economic interests of LGUs and their constituencies. If the process of local development is claimed to be an integral part of national development process, then the participation of the local people both in governmental administration and development is imperative. This requires the participation of the local leadership in the decision-making process concerning priorities in local development and program/project implementation through the use of social organization and group approach.[17] The decision-making powers of the LGUs must be reflected through their significant control over local economic resources that will adequately support local development.

1989

However, the preponderance of political and economic power vested upon the national government   has essentially limited whatever administrative and political autonomy granted to LGUs by the Constitution, Local Government Code, and various laws and statutes. Though this is not to put into test the sincerity of the central government in promoting local autonomy or authentic sharing of political and administrative power with LGUs, but apparently, the institutionalized unitary political structure provided the convenient opportunity and justification in assuring the superiority of the central government and the inferior status of local governments on matters affecting both the national and local polities.

In a United Nations study on local government reform, it was succinctly observed that:

> Central-local government relationship was conditioned by the *inherently superior status* of the national government. Local government units *could not share sovereignty* with the national government, and in law, the authority of the former was circumscribed by whatever parameters the latter chose to adopt.[18]

The lopsided arrangement of functions and responsibilities heavily leaned towards the center does not seem to be conducive in the transformation of the local units into self-reliant communities.   The restrictions and limitations imposed by the central government over the allocation, utilization, and distribution of economic and financial resources of LGUs have been a convenient tool for unwarranted intervention in purely local affairs simply because LGUs do not have any sovereign authority equal to that of the national government.

In the same UN study on local government reform, it noted that the incompatibility between the revenue resources of local government units and the broad scope of their responsibilities encouraged rather than abated the dependence of LGUs to the central government in terms of shares from national taxes and grants-in-aid.[19]

Apparently, "illusionary decentralization" manifests itself when the "formal powers or administrative arrangements are purportedly decentralized but   politically controlled or influenced by the center."[20]

Policy and public administration scholars who continue to work along the premise of the "one-nation, one-state" concept are quite commendable for their efforts to pursue a better option or model of decentralization within the confines of the unitary system. These efforts primarily zero in on the reforms in the political, administrative, and financial aspects of local governments as well as institutional changes necessary at the national and regional levels.[21] Evidently, the type of decentralization being promoted is merely a reaction to the previous regime's highly-centralized political leadership rather than one that would recognize socio-cultural idiosyncracies and distinctiveness of social systems in Philippine society.

There is lack of serious concern for critical and long-range problems which political scientists should address in formulating the most judicious method of power decentralization.   The length of time (nearly a century now) in which the issue of political autonomy has been raised indicates that the processes involved in the

devolution of power to LGUs go beyond the concern of methodologies and schemes. Apparantly, this has become a fundamental problem in the national polity rather than a "topical issue of the moment" which Lasswell says that a policy scientist should be expected to work on.[22]

The creation of the autonomous regions and recognition of regional level of government, by political implication, is nonetheless a political subdivision of the State. This structural arrangement essentially legitimizes the interference of central-ly-formulated policies, in some way or another, into the politico-administrative systems of the indigenous societies.

Iglesias proposes a semi-federal form of government and the adoption of the concept of "silence of consent" to extend further local autonomy.[23] This proposal is anchored on the creation of regional governments conferred with both political and administrative powers, thus constituting as the "next political subdivision to the nation." This has been a laudable proposal towards the empowerment of local governments as the first step in evolving new patterns of genuine self-determina-tion, self-government, self-reliance and dignity through the federal principle. However, the wisdom behind the proposal has been seldom recognized.

In the first quarter of 1988, a new political group was formed -- the *Unlad Bayan*, led by business tycoon Enrique Zobel, which advocates the federalization of the Philippine government. This involves the decentralization and autonomy of local governments based on its economic and cultural development, resembling that of the "states' rights framework of the US government."[24] Apart from this proposal, not much has been publicized yet regarding the details of its political program of government. Nonetheless, Unlad Bayan's federal program should elicit the interest of political scientists in as much as the organization's composition invites more questions rather than solutions to problems of national concern.

Evidently, the protagonists on the decentralization issue are basically divided between those who advocate for the unitary system, concomitant with the various models of devolution of power to LGUs, and those who advocate for the reorganization of the government along federal lines, thereby "effectively" transferring the seat of political power to the LGUs. With economic development and political stability as national concerns, fashioning the most effective and responsive political structures becomes highly significant for they serve as transmission belts in catalyzing and effecting growth and development in the entirety of the nation.

Towards An Understanding of the Majority-Minority Dichotomy: The Implications of the Autonomy Question

Probably the best way to understand the present realities of the Philippine unitary system is to appreciate the Philippines' history of colonialism. The highly centralized unitary form of government which was unabatedly superimposed by the series of colonial regimes was undoubtedly an instrument of national subjugation serving the economic, political, and cultural interests of the colonial masters.

Although the unitary system has been an effective political mechanism in control-ling the hearts and minds of the people and in suppressing the resistance movements,

it failed to break the backbone of the indigenous socio-political systems of the tribal people which we now call the "national minorities." In effect, the present Republic hitherto has not really experienced one history nor has its people lived under one nation with one set of socio-political system.

History has dichotomized the Filipinos into those who succumbed to colonialism and imbibed the colonial masters' social and political system as their own, and those people who resisted the onslaughts of colonial rule and successfully defended and preserved their own way of life. Definitely, the latter lived as a separate people and a nation from the rest of the people of the Republic who were the "acculturated majority." The continuing attempt of the central government to "integrate" the tribal people's systems into the governmental structures of the unitary state is the most immoral act of internal colonialism by the majority people against the national minorities. .

Chroniclers of history and anthropologists never denied the existence of social institutions and governmental systems which arose out of class structures among the people even prior to the colonial rule of the Spanish empire. The pre-colonial societies existed, grew, and developed separately and distinctly from each other and evolved a system of government in accordance with the specific needs and demands of their own people and society at a particular historical epoch.[25] Although there are debates among social scientists on the apt description of social development which the pre-colonial societies had attained, the unassailable fact is that the societies of pre-colonialism were never destroyed but have persisted and survived the twentieth century.

However, these societies did not remain static, isolated, and unaffected by centuries of colonialism. What cannot be denied is the viability of their social systems in sustaining the life of their own people and the tenacity of their societies which were never absorbed into the Christianized and tribute-paying society.

The reality of multi-social system in the country is clearly manifested in the existence of the present-day ethnolinguistically distinct societies among the Filipinos. This does not mean however, that there are as many social structures as there are ethnolinguistic societies. On the contrary, there are as many societies only as there are social structures definitively defined by the function of its ruling class (if any).[26] In other words, the types of society are determined by the roles performed by the classes which wield the political power. And such political power is exercised through a system of governance where policies are both formulated and executed.

For indigenous classless societies, exemplified by the communities of the Ilongots, Mangyans, Negritos, Aetas, and Dumagats, among others, there exists no distinguished class or group which exerts authority or advantage over the others by virtue of ascribed or acclaimed status, neither does a structured government exist. These societies nonetheless continue to formulate policies and decisions endemic to their social system.

Policies and juridical decisions are arrived at collectively with the full participation of the village people and in conjunction with the Council of Elders and Wise Men. The elders in the village who have the reputation of wisdom and knowledge of customary law as a result of their experience, are generally considered the authorities whose decisions

and interpretations of phenomena carry the weight of a law which must be respected and obeyed. The people's participation is imperative since the execution and implementation of policies and decisions are the collective responsibility of the people considering that the Council of Elders does not possess any police power.[27]

Under a class-based society, the emergence of an elite group of people distinguishable for its possession of political and/or economic power over the rest of the people, lays the foundation for a structured system of government. While it may be construed that the division of the pre-colonial societies into classes reflects the nascent social inequalities between those who possess power and those who are powerless defined not by age but by the ability to wield authority and power through military prowess, inheritance of wealth, or by royal lineage, nevertheless the exercise of governance is in accordance with customary laws. The power of the ruling class stems from the willingness of the followers to render it respect; provide material as well as moral support; accept and implement its decisions; and, obey and enforce its orders. The system of government hence, has been largely based on the willingness of the governed to be governed. Furthermore, policies and decisions are formulated and executed on the basis of acceptability and conformity with the moral and cultural parameters of the indigenous societies.

In a warrior society, typified by the Manobos of Agusan and Cotabato and the Isnegs and Kalingas of the Cordillera among others, policies and decisions are made "by the fine adjustment of general principles of custom law to the comparative social standing of contending parties, such as status arising from their total warrior strength and heirloom wealth."[28] The ruling class must possess an undisputed skill in arbitrating disputes, sufficient wealth to invite visitors to feast and readiness in helping dependents in times of need apart from its reputable skill in the conduct of battles.

On the other hand, the ethno-linguistic groupings in the Cordillera-- the Ifugaos, Bontocs, Kankanays, and Ibalois among others, comprise the pre-Hispanic societies where the economic and political affairs are governed not by a warrior class but by a socially and politically recognized class of rich men whose wealth are both ascribed and acquired through inheritance, birthright, or performance of public prestige feast which makes the whole community indebted.[29] However, membership in the privileged class (known as "plutocrats") is not absolute since it is periodically re-validated through the ostentatious display of heirloom wealth and sponsorship of prestige feasts. Like the warrior society, authority and power of the ruling class are limited to their defined territories and do not extend to those people who do not recognize its leadership, nor does it impose its authority through absentee landlordism or territorial subjugation. Apparently, such political limitations contributed towards the creation of a tenacious community apart from cultural considerations.

Among the class societies which survived the onslaught of colonization and proselytization, the societies which profess Islam -- found in Sulu Archipelago, the flood plain of the Pulangi River Valley, Lanao Lake region between Illana and Iligan Bays, and a few outlying islands like Cagayan de Sulu among others--present a more or less centralized or centralizing governments. Apparently, the centralizing feature of the Muslim's political system forms the antithesis of the other pre-colonial class societies whose political power and authority are collectively shared among the members of the

governing class in accordance with the collective will of the community rather than concentrated on one central authority.

Among the Muslim societies, members of the ruling class virtually comprise the aristocrats whose claim to leadership is through birthright and bestowed to the direct descendants of other such rulers in accordance with the established political hierarchy emanating from the paramount ruler of a royal state. While the Muslims believe that a ruler must be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad-- a sharif, other class societies on the other hand have traditionally recognized and accepted their rulers on the basis of community sanction which is in contrast with the former's belief in the "divine approval." The emergence of aristocracy in the Philippines therefore can be construed as more of a product of cultural implication rather than a result of social development and political transformation. Islam as a culture and way of life remains the key factor in precipitating the establishment of a centralized government. Islam rather than the centralized political structure has been responsible in organizing the disparate desires into shared plans of action and rules of behavior.

The political centralism experienced in the Muslim society is distinctly different from what is known to be practiced under the modern unitary system of government. The difference lies in the loci where authority is exerted. In the case of the Muslims, the *datus* and/or the titled overlords exert their political authority over supporting lesser lords rather than over the populace. In other words, the rulers do not rule over geographic domains but over bodies of individual followers. Likewise, the *sultans* who are considered the chief rulers among datus govern not over a realm but over the datu supporters including those who may not belong to his society or geographic jurisdiction.[30] Political authority therefore is exercised by the governing class not in accordance with its spatial or aerial dominion but on the basis of relationship established between the ruling class and its subjects or its lower lords characterized by vertical dyadic ties.[31] Moreover, the dyadic ties among the Muslims which have been a behavioral pattern rooted in their culture constitute one of the major factors in the creation of a "one-nation, one-state" concept among the people professing Islam.

While it may be incontestable that the Muslims were successful in the defense of their socio-politico-cultural life against all forms of colonization, it cannot be simply attributed to the centralized or centralizing form of government of the Muslim society which had been characterized by some as a "confederation of villages" or the emergence of a "more complex governmental institution(s)."[32] In the first place, what existed is a confederation of datus whose political authority has been rooted through kinship relationship transcending over geographic jurisdiction rather than through the established tiers of governmental structures. This indicates neither an intricate nor a complicated governmental institution but simply a reflection of royal lineage of political leadership in the datu system.

The usual tendency to attribute the tenacity and unity among the Muslim communities to the centralizing and unitary political system as the key factor in resisting colonization is but a simplistic theory in the apprehension of the function of political structures as the mechanism in defining social relations and political objectives. Notably, classless and class societies as aforecited which did not and probably will never go through a centralized governmental structure, similarly, stood unrelentingly against all

attempts of colonizers to subjugate their communities. Likewise, they survived the present century and successfully preserved their identity apart from the rest of the people. Evidently, it was not the political system endemic to the pre-colonial societies which has been responsible in bringing about a consolidated and tenacious community. It was the cultural system whereby kinship and community relations are defined which played the dominant role in framing the political and economic systems of the indigenous societies.

The pre-Hispanic people of the Philippines which we now call the "minorities" remain the only legacy of our forefathers who successfully preserved the pristine social systems and the continuing defense of their homelands against colonialism. The struggle being waged by the Igorots of the Cordillera and Muslims of southern Mindanao must be distinguished from that of the CPP-NPA-NDF. The struggle of the tribal Filipinos is not hinged on the seizure of power from the present government. It is meant merely to safeguard their national identity, culture, and social systems which are distinct from the Christian communities. It is a struggle of a nation in search of equality, sovereignty, and democracy in the context of their own social setting and cultural distinctiveness.

In a country which is composed of varied political systems, social structures, and economic formations defined by its cultural idiosyncracies, any pronouncement of "national integration" which seeks to remold the Igorots and Moros into the way of life of the Christian majority is most morally unjustified. Certainly, whatever social and economic system the majority people conceives and builds in the entirety of the archipelago, no matter how well-meaning, will produce social aberration. For democracy to be real in this country, the tribal people must be given the opportunity to run their own political affairs, have control over their resources and own development, and cease to be treated as second class citizens.

The continued imposition by the Philippine government of uniform policies for the entirety of the unitary state based on the standard of the majority's interest has been the most visible manifestation of internal colonialism in the country. The institutionalization of a single policy brought about by a unitary system is nothing but a forced solidarity of imposed uniformity. Any prescription of "obligatory" policy that would work towards homogenization and oneness where there is stark socio-politico-cultural and economic heterogeneity and diversity is an ultimate threat not only to distinct communities but to political stability, unity, and peace.

Apparently, a unitary governmental system is not only inappropriate in resolving the national question but also works against the realization of democracy and equality among the Filipino people. The search of the various pre-Hispanic and uncolonized people for a full and competitive niche within the systems and institutions of the country's social framework is a genuine historical claim to self-determination. It is this claim for national equality among the tribal people to be on the same footing with the majority group that would make the majority- minority dichotomy unnecessary.

In summary, the unitary Philippine state was an arbitrary creation of the succession of foreign colonial powers that invaded these islands. However, the Philippine government that succeeded the series of colonial administrations has, sadly enough, continued the ways of the colonial masters especially in relation to the uncolonized people. And in

1989

a most ironic twist of fate, the formerly colonized Filipinos-- the majority -- treat their uncolonized brothers-- the minority -- not unlike what the colonial masters did to the colonized people.

The subjugation of the uncolonized people to the rule of the majority from the seat of power, now as in the days of the colonial masters in Manila, is the most visible manifestation of internal colonialism. The concentration of political power wielded by the national leaders basically remained the same since the first Spanish governor-general ruled from Malacañang more than 300 years ago. Yet this power, still imperial in its essence, "has not been exercised with commensurate responsibility, for the government's presence in many parts of the country has not been felt in terms of its duty to protect its citizens and provide essential public services, including justice, health and safety."[33]

Internal aggression against local governments and cultural communities has been manifested in various ways. Among the most evident ones is the control of the central government in the exploitation, allocation, utilization, and distribution of economic resources-- i.e., natural, financial, and technical, which have been skewed and prejudiced to the interest of the Manila government. This partiality in the claim and "right" of the central authorities over the national patrimony bear an undesirable impact into the economic development and growth of local governments and cultural com-munities.

The Chico River Basin and Cellophil projects of the government as well as the relentless operations of foreign-owned mining corporations in the Cordilleras, the unabated destruction of forest reserves in Mindanao and Northern Luzon, and con-tinued incursions of the Japanese fishing vessels into Philippine waters for our marine resources are few cases which exemplify the real beneficiaries of the national patrimony. And ironically, all of these were done and remain to be done presumably to "serve the national interests."

Building Federalism in a Multi-Nation State Structure:
A Framework in Achieving Unity Through Diversity

While it is most appreciated that the wisdom of federalism as an alternative political structure of the Philippines is slowly permeating into the national polity, it is most unfortunate that among its proponents -- notably the well-financed Unlad Bayan, seem to accentuate and exploit the political enmities between the national and local govern-ments in relation to the skewed power distribution. It also remains silent over the issue of granting authentic and genuine political autonomy to the Cordillera, Muslim-dominated areas of Mindanao, and other tribal communities in the country. Moreover, as it advocates for a substantial devolution of power to local governments, it has been reticent over the principle of *coordinative* division of powers which will assure unity in the entirety of the nation despite its naked diversities.

Although these glaring oversights on the principle of federalism may have been honestly committed by Unlad Bayan for some reasons or another, nonetheless, the composition of this organization still leaves us more room to doubt the member's sincerity in settling the issues of local autonomy and decentralization beyond their political and personal concerns. The composition appears to be a mix of businessmen who are not exactly happy with the administration, and bureaucrats and politicians who

have either fallen out of grace from the Aquino government or suffered political debacles from it. It seems an unlikely group to offer the hand of assistance unless there is conformity with their vested interests.

Columnist Hilarion Henares, Jr. made an incisive analysis of Unlad Bayan's composition, to quote:

> Of its 40 founding members, only six are recognizable nationalists: *Bono Adaza, Aguedo Agbayani, Teng Puyat, Jose Laurel, Jr., Ike Sobrepeña,* and *Ka Luis Taruc.* Most of the rest share the sentiments of *Ike Belo,* pro-American by honest conviction; and *Bro. Andrew Gonzales* of the crazy Moonies, *Doy Laurel* the McCarthyist, and *Blas Ople* the Paul-turned-Saul-of-Tarsus, who are pro-Americans for no good reasons at all. *Of the 11 board members of Unlad, only one is known to be a nationalist.*[34]

The nationalist posture of Unlad Bayan and its policy proposal for the Federalization of the Philippines do not really serve to strengthen national unity but on the contrary, promote political division, manipulation, and conquest which is "more in keeping with the thinking of the Unholy Three: Bro. Andrew of the Crazy Moonies, McCarthyist Doy and Blas of Tarsus."[35]

However, this does not necessarily follow that the idea of federalism is totally dangerous. In fact, the basis for a federal form of government is most apparent under the country's socio-economic-political and cultural peculiarities where deep-seated diversities are defined in accordance with sub-national loyalties and solidarities. It is a better alternative to political decentralization of the unitary system not only as a sound economic strategy for regional and national development but an imperative towards resolving the national question and eventually rebuilding the nation which has been torn apart by political strifes.

Historical realities had indicated the existence of indigenous nations in the Philippine archipelago -- the Cordillera and Moro nations -- whose endemic social and political systems persisted over generations.[36] As such, this does not give the Christian-based national government any moral authority to subject and extend its political control over the minority people and cause the adoption of uniform structures, systems, and ways of life. This is a naked transgression of the national integrity of people living in social systems which are distinct from the proselytized and acculturized Filipinos. This is a violation of the right to self-determination guaranteed by the *Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples.*

The presence of at least three major nations, including the Christian nation, in the entirety of the country can be ascribed from the different historical factors that have been involved in the making of each nation, nationality, and nationalism. Likewise, the different political, economic, social, and geographic conditions have definitely in-fluenced their development. The nationalism of each people has hence expressed itself differently and altered with time. Whereas, the Christian-majority people's nationalism did not take root in their indigenous history as it has been characterized to be a history of colonialism, the Cordilleran and Moro nationalism have been expressed through the historic defense of their respective homelands against colonial and post-colonial im-perial expansion.

1989

The Christian struggle against external aggression did not only fail but even imbibed its colonizer's culture as if it was their own. It has been a mixture of foreign cultures -- as many as the number of foreign colonizers who invaded the land, which superimposed upon the indigenous culture. And it was through this culture, perceived to be superior than the other Filipino cultures, that the majority people structured their political, economic, and social systems. Evidently, the foreign colonizers, specifically the Americans, imprinted their history upon the colonized people and influenced the former's systems of governance through the structures which were conveniently adopted without due consideration to the idiosyncracies of other ethnic groups living in the country.

Thus, the national government operates now under the systems and structures which have been a product of colonialism and suited to serve the colonial interests rather than of the Philippine interests. With the foreign culture unabashedly accepted by the majority people who now dominate the entire Republic, any form of subjugation or institutional influence that would force the "integration" of the minority into the structures and systems of the colonized Filipinos (who has become more and more of their foreign colonizers and less and less of their ancestors) constitutes an internal encroachment against the sovereign rights of other nations existing in the Republic.

Nation Defined

By etymology, the word nation comes from the Latin *natio* which has the same stem as *natus*, and both come from *nascor* which means, "I am born." *Natio* means a group of people belonging together because of similarity of birth.[37] As birth implies life, a struggle of a nation is a struggle of a people for life, identity, and survival. For a people in struggle to survive, loyalty to the family and tribe is a primordial requirement. Patriotism is expressed and identified with supreme devotion to the nation, thus, the consciousness of the people as one nation manifests itself into a national consciousness. In effect, loyalty, patriotism and national consciousnes are basic requirements in nationalism.

The term *nation* today as defined by scholars is a "historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture." Moreover, it has been conceived to have the following elements, to wit:

> *(1)* a certain defined unit of territory; *(2)* common cultural characteristics such as language (or widely understood languages), customs, manners, and literature (folk tales and lore are a beginning). If an individual believes he shares these and wishes to continue sharing them, he is usually said to be a member of the nationality; *(3)* a common independent or sovereign government (type does not matter) or the desire for one. The 'principle' that each nationality should be separate and independent is involved here; *(4)* a belief in a common history and in a common origin; *(5)* a common pride in the achievement and a common sorrow in its tragedies; and, *(6)* a disregard for or hostility to other groups, especially if these prevent or seem to threaten the separate national existence.[38]

On the other hand, *nationalism* has been meant and defined by scholars and nationalists to be :(1) the love of a common soil, race, language, or historical culture; (2) a desire for a political independence, security, and prestige of the nation.[39]

This is to say that nationalism is a result of a multitude of historical, political, economic, and social forces whose sentiment of unity grew within groups of people which have expressed themselves into a devotion to what is called the nation. At the present context, nationalism is denoted as a sentiment of unity among a group of people who has a *real or imagined* common historical experience, common culture and economic and social institutions. However, it may likewise disappear through the destructive conquests of a super nation or in class warfare.[40]

Under this framework, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the Cordillera and Moro people indeed constitute a nation as they lived and survived the present century with their distinct social, economic, and political systems and structures. On the other hand, the formation of the majority people's nation followed a different pattern of development. Its nationhood was artificially formed and did not evolve from its own soil, setting, and structures. Understandably, its people associate themselves more with the characteristics and ways of life of the colonizers than with their forefathers. A sign of its exogenous creation is the absence of national language. Instead, the people use a foreign one in the conduct of official transactions and affairs of the nation.

Imperatives of Federalism

In a country where at least three major nations are in existence, the federal form of government is most imperative. This is a better form of political system where democracy is assured and guaranteed under a multi-nation state set-up. The American type of democracy where political power is measured by numbers just cannot be appreciated when the majority violates the inherent and fundamental rights and freedoms of the minority.

Power which is solely derived from numbers does not necessarily legitimize the majority rule, although numbers, as Marx recognized, are a possible major source of power. For instance, the Filipinos are not governed and were never governed by those who come from the major classes in the Christian society. The US-sponsored electoral process has not been an effective barometer in assuring that the majority rules. The political leaders who wield power neither come from the 70% peasant class nor to the 20% working class who comprise the majority of the Christian population, but belong to the upper 1% of the society -- the landlords, capitalists, and the bourgeois classes. Nor did the rural people, who represent the majority, rule over the urbanite minority. The reality has been the reverse -- the minority rules over the majority.

The majority-minority relations therefore cannot be legitimately measured by number of votes or by people who possess the majority or minority culture. Apparently, political power is in accordance with which class wields the economic power. Thus, the measurement of democracy by the number of people involved in the electoral process does not provide the true and genuine picture of political freedom.

The political inequalities present in the social structures of the Christian communities evidently lies in the prevailing inequalities in its economic opportunities. And as the unitary system provides the political legitimacy to rule over the indigenous societies, the inimical consequence is the reproduction and diffusion of inequalities rather than the spread of progress. Such political dominance would likewise facilitate

the intrusion of alien and degenerate culture by the majority- people into the social fabric of the minorities.

An adoption of a single social norm or language based on the majority's viewpoint and standpoint would not in any way represent the totality of Philippine nationhood. The Cordillerans and Moros certainly have a common culture and distinct social system which are not morally inferior, even if materially wanting compared to the majority society. There is absolutely no moral imperative for one-sided "national integration" that seeks to remold the minorities into the ways of the majority people.

On the other hand, the minority groups would also be justified in seeing themselves in a high moral ground. They did not provide the pillars of the Spanish, American, and Japanese colonial state in the Philippines. They were not the ones who produced the aberration of a social system that was the fascist regime of Marcos, and certainly, they are not the ones who continue to provide the main pillar of a neo-colonial social order in the country by being the surrogates of foreign interests.

The Cordillera and Moro nations are the repository of positive human relations, social values, moral attitudes, and spiritual wealth -- all those ideals of revolutionaries and visionaries of the majority people who fail to see these as already existing in the country. Definitely, these peoples have much to contribute to the development of a unified Philippine society that is just, humane, and responsible to the common good.

However, the superimposition of the unitary system did not only stifle the initiative and potential contribution of the indigenous people towards national development. It created the political superstructure which circumscribed the full and unfettered development and growth of the Igorot and Moro societies. It is an illegitimate political infringement into the inherent and sovereign will of a people seeking equality among the family of nations.

To institute reform into the unitary system through the decentralizaton and autonomy provision in the Constitution does not in any way solve the problem but merely provides a palliative answer. The issue involved is simply not political but a question of nationhood. The political conflicts arising in the Cordilleras and Moroland cannot be construed as a quest for political power in the entirety of the country. On the other hand, the repeated frustrations of local governments in the Christian communities to substantially exercise their political authority and power over their own constituents have been due to the inherent infirmities of a unitary structure of government.

The federal political structure offers the most appropriate system of governance where the national identity of nations are preserved and maintained while at the same time political unity and democracy are promoted. This structure assures that a number of separate states are merged into a single federal republic with the legislative and executive powers divided *co-ordinately* between federation and unit governments, each of which acts directly on the people. This is a democracy based on bargains and compromises,[41] and as the Aquino government claims, a democracy based on "reconciliation."

Apparently, the federal system which is a form of government for people of multi-national states who wish to be united, approximates Philippine realities better than

the unitary system installed by our colonial masters. It offers a form of multi-national government in which maximum political unity can be combined with a recognition of deep-seated diversities. And with the virtue of system of compromises, it offers a solution to the problem of how men can fulfill their needs both for local and larger loyalties -- a nationalism expressed for the supra- and sub-nation.

The suitability of federalism becomes more perceptible as the major diversities are geographically grouped. The territorial expression of cultural differences makes governance easier and feasible compared to a country where major diversities have no inclusive territorial base and traverse in the whole society, resulting in racial or communal conflict with the intermingled communities. The existence of well-defined territories among the major minority groups makes unity square with diversity. As a testimony among scholars and practitioners of political systems, it was found out that "federation can succeed only where (racial) diversities are geographically grouped."[42]

As far as the pre-conditions for federalism are concerned, the Philippines has relatively satisfied these, to wit: (1) a previous existence of the federating states as distinct colonies or states with distinct governments of their own; (2) a divergence of economic interests between the federating states leading to the desire of the states to remain independent for certain economic purposes; (3) geographical obstacles to effective unitary government, i.e., large areas separated by bodies of water, mountains or any physical obstacles, poor communications, etc.; (4) differences of culture, religion, language or nationality; (5) dissimilarity of social institutions; and (6) existence of their own set of laws, norms, practices, and ways of life.[43]

A "federal situation" is thus, a highly delicate balance of coalescing and conflicting forces that must be maintained in order to avoid or mitigate any attempt of the Philippine society to totally secede from the Republic. The differences of culture, religion, and social system in the entirety of the Nation nonetheless, help maintain such balance; not unless it is shattered by fundamental cleavages which essentially arise from the undue institutionalization of a single norm, culture, and social system thus, limiting the opportunity for such differences to grow, develop, and co-exist with the dominant socio-economic- political-cultural systems. Evidently, it has been the unitary system which continually posed the threatening political structure for such balance to be shattered.

Iglesias aptly describes the advantages of a federal structure for the country which are as follows: (1) it accords equal status and treatment for the need of all parts of the country regardless of ethnic, religious, linguistic, or geographical location; (2) it leads to less pressure for separation from the nation-state as peculiar needs of various cultural groups are defined in accordance with their own customary and religious practices and enhances the development of their resources based on their own identified priorities; (3) it serves as an equalizing factor as it promotes a more balanced socio-economic and political development attuned to the needs of the region, thus, a greater participation from the people is enhanced in terms of the decision-making process; (4) it brings the government closer to the people and becomes more sensitive to their problems and needs; and finally, (5) it enhances national integration and unity.[44]

It is axiomatic that federalism is inseparable from liberal democracy. It is not just a particular kind of central-local relations. Federalism is something of a midpoint on a

1989

continuum of political systems. At one extreme is a purely unitary system in which all decision-making power resides in the national government and sub-national units exist only to carry out the directives of the national government.[45]

On the other hand, the other extreme is the system in which no national government exists and the "sub-units" are independent countries. Federalism is a system of government that includes a national government and at least one level of sub-national governments (i.e., states, provinces, or other LGUs) and that enables each level to make some significant decisions independently of the others.[46] Although the independence in decision-making is not absolute, it gives each level the ability to make decisions without the approval (formal or informal) of the other level.

Contrary to the impression of some that a federal system for the Philippines is tantamount to a prescription for irredentism, separatism or secession, the realities of Philippine peculiarities indicate that federalism is not only inevitable, it is imprescriptible. Apparently, it is the better form of governmental structure as far as preserving the integrity, unity, and oneness of the country is concerned. As in the words of Max Hildebert Boehm, writing for the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences:

> Federalism in its broadest and most general sense is a principle which conceives of the federation as the ideal form of social and political life. It is characterized by a tendency to substitute *coordinating* for subordinating relationships or at least to restrict the latter as much as possible; to replace compulsion from above with *reciprocity, understanding and adjustment*, command with persuasion and force with law. The basic aspect of federalism is pluralistic, its fundamental tendency is *harmonization*, and its regulative principle is *solidarity*.[47]

As federalism promotes democracy, centralism forces undue obedience. As federalism enhances Philippine nationhood, centralism forces unity and homogenization. As federalism expresses confidence over the ideals of liberty and freedom, centralism remains the "refuge of fear."

The federal system of government for the Philippines offers a resolution towards the national question. It remains the citadel for democracy to be assured and guaranteed. It secures not only the sovereignty of the Republic but the future of people's lives. But let no one use the name of the people against the people for they will be judged by history.

Endnotes

[1] Rollie Buendia, "The Case of the Cordillera: An Unresolved National Question," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (April 1987), pp. 157-185. A related research study on the historical roots of the Philippine administrative system vis-a-vis the socio-economic and political development of the country has been undertaken. The study entitled "The Philippine Administrative System: A Question of National Identity" posits the development of the administrative system more as a political policy of the colonial masters to perpetuate their dominance and rule, either overtly or covertly, over national interest and genuine independence. Such being the case, the politico-administrative system which rests on the concept of "one nation, one state," is a product of colonialism rather than a result of a social evolution traversing the endogenous course of history. Consequently, the aberration in the development of ne politico-administrative structures in the country has become an impediment rather than a facility in evolving a policy framework germane to Philippine social transformation.

[2] Alex Bello Brillantes, Jr., "Decentralization in the Philippines: An Overview," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (April 1987), pp. 134-139.

[3] Antonio Orendain, *Philippine Local Government Code: Annotated* (Alpha Omega Publications: 1983), p. 2. See "Section 2 Declaration of Policy."

[4] Romeo B. Ocampo and Elena Panganiban, *The Philippine Local Government System: History, Politics and Finance* (Local Government Center, University of the Philippines - College of Public Administration: 1985), p.10.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 2-7; Brillantes, *op.cit.*

[6] Orendain, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-16.

[7] UP-College of Public Administration, "Revenue-Raising Powers of Local Government," *Local Finance Survey of 1980* (University of the Philippines -College of Public Administration: 1985), p. 4.

[8] Orendain, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[9] Ocampo and Panganiban, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[10] Leonor Magtolis-Briones, *Philippine Public Fiscal Administration* (National Research Council and Commission on Audit: Quezon City, 1983), pp. 198-200.

[11] Orendain, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[12] Juan Ponce Enrile, "Federalism: The Answer to Manila's Imperialism," Speech delivered before a joint meeting of Rotary Clubs from Pasay, Parañaque, and Las Piñas at the Hyatt Regency, April 27, 1988.

[13] Ocampo and Panganiban, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

[14] Jose V. Abueva, "Philippine Ideologies and National Development," in Raul De Guzman and Mila Reforma (eds.), *Government and Politics of the Philippines* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1988), pp. 68-69.

[15] Enrile, *op. cit.*

[16]*Ibid.*

[17]Raul P. De Guzman and Proserpina Tapales, Chapters 5 and 6, "Proceedings of the Seminar on Financing Local Development," *Local Government Bulletin* (December-January 1978).

[18]United Nations, Local Government Reform: Analysis of Experience in Selected Countries (New York, 1975). Cf. Perfecto L. Padilla, "Central-Local Government Partnership in Development," *Local Government Bulletin* (December-January 1978), p.47, italics supplied.

[19]*Ibid.*, p.47.

[20]James W. Fesler, "Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization," *Journal of Politics* (August, 1965), pp. 536-38, 555-57; Cf. Keith G. Baker, "Public Choice Theory: Some Important Assumptions and Public-Policy Implications," Robert T. Golembiewski, Frank Gibson & Geoffrey Y. Cognog (eds.), *Readings in Institutions, Processes, Behaviour and Policy*, (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1976), p. 50.

[21]Romeo B. Ocampo, "Toward a More Authentic Local Autonomy: Premises and Proposals for Reform," p. 1. Paper presented at the PSSC Symposium on Social Issues on April 17, 1986 and reprinted as one of the reading materials in the National Seminar on Decentralization Towards Rural Development sponsored by the UP-Local Government Center, held in Manila Midtown Hotel on November 24-25, 1986.

[22]Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method* (Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 1951), p. 8. Also see Harold D. Lasswell, *A Pre-View of Policy Sciences* (Elsevier Publishing Co.: New York, 1971).

[23]A principle which states that "what is not exercised by the center nor denied by it to the local units may be assumed to fall within the purview of local action." See Gabriel U. Iglesias, "Structure of Government," a paper submitted to NEDA's Committee on "Economic Recovery and Long-Run Growth" and published in Chapter V of *Economic Recovery and Long-Run Growth: Agenda for Reforms* (Philippine Institute for Development Studies, May 1, 1986), pp. 92-107. Cf. Gabriel U. Iglesias, "Towards A Decentralization Strategy Through Regional Governments." A paper presented at the Symposium on the Concept of Decentralization in Government on May 24, 1986 and reprinted as one of the reading materials in the National Seminar on Decentralization Towards Rural Development, Manila Midtown Hotel, November 24-25, 1986.

[24]Hilarion M. Henares, Jr. "Unlad Bayan: God Makes the Filipino," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, April 6, 1988 p. 5.

[25]William Henry Scott, "Class Structure in the Unhispanized Philippines," *Cracks in the Parchment Curtain* (New Day Publishers Inc., Quezon City. 1982), p. 127.

[26]*Ibid.*, p.128

[27]*Ibid.*, p. 130.

[28]*Ibid.*, p. 134.

[29]*Ibid.*, p. 135.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[31] Kinship relationship manifests through a network of mutual aid relationships between pairs of individuals ("dyadic" ties in anthropological terminology), i.e., between the rulers and its personal followers or between rulers in the hierarchy of the aristocrats, rather than of community relationships as structured among the other class societies.

[32] Ocampo and Panganiban, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[33] Enrile, *op. cit.*

[34] Henares, *op. cit.*, italics supplied.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] In Ferdinand Tonnie's Book, Gemeinschaft and Gesellsschaft or "Community and Society." Translated and supplemented by Charles P. Loomis, London, Routledge and Paul (1955). Community (Gemeinschaft) is characterized by strong emotional ties, ascribed status, harmonious roles, cultural homogeneity, and strong moral and spiritual bonds, all of which contribute to solidarity relations and stability of social life and organized in a "natural" way. which involves the totality of social being. Society (Gesellsschaft) on the other hand refers to large-scale, impersonal and contractual ties.

[37] Guido Zernatto. "Nation, History of a Word," *Review of Politics*, Vol. VI (1944), 351 pp.

[38] *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, p. 7. Cf. Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality* (1968), p. 9.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 6 and 10.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[41] F.G. Carnell, "Political Implications of Federalism in New States," in U.K. Hicks, *et. al.*, *Federalism and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries: A Symposium* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961). Excerpts from pp. 16-24.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] K.C. Wheare, *Federal Government* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1951).

[44] Gabriel U. Iglesias, "The Advantages of a Federal Form of Government" (mimeographed), n.d.

[45] David C. Nice, "Federalism: The Setting of Intergovernmental Relations," *Federalism: The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations* (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1987), p.3.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 2

[47] Max Hildebert Boehm, *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Cf Enrile, *op cit.*, italics supplied.